Threats to national security are constantly changing. While cyberattacks and AI weaknesses often make the news, another hidden danger is compromised computer and network hardware. Bad actors may tamper with the equipment that runs U.S. defense and essential services.
Most cybersecurity efforts focus on fixing software problems, but a serious threat lies in the hardware itself. Countries like Russia, China and Iran might carry out long-term “subtle sabotage” plans by adding hidden weaknesses into key parts like computer boards, microchips and network devices. These hidden changes can stay inactive for years, avoiding regular security checks until they are turned on to cause significant disruptions. This secret risk shows that our hardware can be a weak spot that enemies use whenever they choose.
Last fall’s Israeli pager attack shows how dangerous this can be. In that case, explosive devices secretly placed by Israel resulted in the deaths and injuries of thousands of Hezbollah terrorists. This event shows how hidden, compromised hardware can be activated remotely to cause massive damage when a determined enemy uses it.
The way global supply chains work makes this threat possible. The manufacture of computer chips and boards involves many suppliers worldwide, a complex distribution process, and ongoing maintenance. Every step offers a chance for bad actors to introduce compromised hardware.
Enemies can take advantage of many points along the supply chain. Small changes made during design or chip production can hide dangerous flaws. These changes might be further hidden when parts are assembled and tested. As products pass through many hands and locations, it becomes increasingly difficult to check whether they are genuine and safe. This complex process allows fake or tampered hardware to sneak into systems — a “ticking time bomb” waiting to go off.
Fake and unauthorized parts have been found in sensitive systems: Fraudulent electronics sold to the Defense Logistics Agency, for example, were meant for a nuclear submarine and a missile system. Counterfeit Cisco gear was discovered in equipment for F-18s, F- 22s, Apache helicopters and B-52 bombers. These cases reveal a clear risk — if these were found, many more unsafe parts might be hidden in critical systems.
The heart of this threat is the deliberate tampering with hardware components using advanced techniques. Bad actors can add hidden circuits, often called “hardware trojans,” during the design or manufacturing stages, letting them stay hidden until activated to cause a breakdown. Counterfeit microchips that look normal but carry secret backdoors or weakened circuits are equally worrying. And harmful code can be placed in the device’s firmware, remaining unseen until it is turned on remotely. All these tricks are designed to pass regular tests and checks, keeping the dangerous features hidden until they are deliberately exploited.
Compromised hardware is very dangerous because it stays inactive until remote signals, timers or environmental changes deliberately turn it on. This hidden power can be used to disrupt key systems — to make missiles fail, to change controls in aircraft and submarines, to mess with data flows, and to upset satellites and GPS. Computer networks and data centers are also at risk of attack, which can lead to widespread failures across connected systems.
Moreover, these issues break the trust in global supply chains and may create long-term instability in our security. Basically, dealing with compromised hardware forces expensive changes and makes us worry.
The fight against this threat requires a strong, multi-layered plan.
First, we must secure our supply chain by carefully checking suppliers, tracing every part from start to finish and using trusted manufacturing programs. Better testing methods — such as non-invasive imaging and side-channel analysis — and ongoing checks can ensure every component is safe before it is used. It is also essential for the government and private companies to work together, share information and develop new technology while cooperating with other countries. New rules are needed to enforce strict standards for buying hardware and to support local manufacturing. Finally, we must prepare by setting up dedicated response teams and building strong backup systems to lessen future problems.
Compromised hardware is a serious and ever-growing threat to our national security. Its ability to hide in important systems puts us at great risk, and every moment we wait makes the danger worse. We must recognize the full extent of this threat and act now. By taking strong, proactive steps, we can only protect our essential systems and build a defense ready for relentless and smart attacks.
Roei Ganzarski is the CEO of Alitheon, an optical-AI technology company focused on ensuring and securing supply chains.
