A ceasefire in the U.S.-China trade war doesn’t change the fact that Americans are subject to Beijing’s whims when it comes to critical supplies of everything from magnets to minerals. This is not an accident but the result of decades of Beijing’s deliberate practices to build monopolies, dominate supply chains, stifle competition, and foster resource dependencies.
But the U.S. and its allies can break China’s stranglehold on the battery supply chain, if they work together now to build the components and mine the minerals that go into advanced batteries, while fighting back against China’s market manipulation.
In our new report, Unplugging Beijing: A Playbook to Reclaim America’s Advanced Battery Supply Chains, we lay out the scale and scope of China’s non-market practices in battery supply chains — dumping, price manipulation, intellectual property theft, monopolies, and forced technology transfers — and, more importantly, say what America can do about it.
One key way in which China controls the battery market is through intentional overproduction — making too much of everything — driving prices below profitability in ways that push out competition. For 2025, Chinese analysts are projecting that China will make twice as many electric cars as the entire global demand from last year.
While enormous subsidies and state support cushion Chinese companies, American companies cannot sustain unprofitable production. China’s decision to dump cheap batteries and underlying minerals on global markets sustains their monopolies but harms free markets and open competition.
Beijing may finally be acknowledging that its massive overproduction of just about everything is fueling a race to the bottom. But as the central government frets about what Xi Jinping has labeled “disorderly price competition,” local governments in China are still backing absurd strategies to juice production, such as state-sponsored programs to sell brand new cars as “zero-mileage” used cars — sold at a loss and dumped on foreign markets, but allowing companies to inflate sales numbers to justify factories operating at full tilt.
While Beijing deploys a suite of non-market tactics at scale, its price manipulation is especially damaging. Advanced batteries depend on a host of refined minerals — lithium, nickel, cobalt, and graphite — that are responsible for most of the cost of the resulting battery. China’s intervention in nickel markets, for instance, has saddled Western producers with unsustainable costs. In lithium, Beijing has driven prices up or down at will, undermining competing U.S. projects.
To counter this, we propose creating a critical minerals and metals exchange, backed by physical assets and a U.S. strategic stockpile. This would offer offtake guarantees above a price floor to support domestic processors.
China’s monopolies on mineral processing have also become a weapon in the broader trade war. Beijing has imposed export restrictions on key minerals, including graphite — of which it controls more than 95 percent of global battery-grade processing. To reduce these choke points, we advocate for the creation of special economic zones that co-locate processing, infrastructure, and energy access near known reserves.
These zones could take advantage of colocation synergies around large reserves, such as the Salton Sea, and could feature pre-vetted environmental analysis and rigorous safety protocols to localize mining, on-site processing, downstream fabrication, energy, and water needs for all related infrastructure.
We also recommend expanding the U.S. Development Finance Corporation’s risk appetite to back more processing projects internationally.
Beyond supply and demand, China’s record on intellectual property theft is extensive. Most Chinese espionage cases involve attempts to acquire commercial technology. The battery sector is a repeated target: the Justice Department has charged Chinese actors with stealing battery tech from Tesla and Phillips 66. Many of China’s non-market tactics — from forced labor to environmental shortcuts — thrive in secrecy.
To increase transparency, we recommend that the U.S. bar foreign firms from selling into American markets unless they meet strict digital customs and trade data standards. U.S.-listed companies should also be required to map their full supply chains to expose any hidden reliance on forced labor.
To compete with all this, the U.S. must invest in cleaner, more efficient, and higher-performing manufacturing processes. We propose increased academic research in battery science in exchange for low-cost licensing to U.S. companies, full cost recovery for research and development in the tax code, and publicly owned modular testing facilities to reduce innovation barriers for smaller firms.
There is a way forward — if we choose to act boldly. New supply chains won’t emerge from one nation alone. We need domestic reindustrialization and international ally-shoring. Both require upgraded infrastructure and reliable access to the raw inputs of advanced manufacturing — minerals, chemicals, and tooling. Strengthened trade rules, coordinated tariffs, and harmonized regulations among market economies are essential. Most importantly, this effort must be spearheaded by strong American leadership and a dynamic, integrated North American trading bloc.
Rebuilding America’s supply chains will take industrial work and political will, but we must commit to the hard tasks now to protect our economic security and resilience for the long term. The future of American prosperity depends on it.
Elaine Dezenski is senior director and head of the Center on Economic and Financial Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Joshua Birenbaum serves as deputy director.
