Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent trip to China has rightly gotten the attention of many global strategists. Some in Washington seem especially concerned that Modi’s first trip to China since 2018 signals a potential rapprochement between New Delhi and Beijing, a development that could undermine many years of U.S. efforts to build up India as a counterweight to growing Chinese power in Asia.
Yet, it would be a major mistake to view this evident turnaround in China-India relations through a zero-sum lens (and thus as a problem for U.S. national security). American national interests will be well served if the two Asian giants can “bury the hatchet” on their decades-long border dispute, embrace compromise and return to more pragmatic bilateral relations.
For one, global trade and prosperity will be enhanced through much more extensive China-India trade linkages and, fundamentally, the world will not have to watch nervously as two nuclear-armed powers engage in regular, violent skirmishing. Most importantly, U.S. interests will be served by accepting the new multipolar world, including the distinct Chinese and Indian poles within that new global order.
China-India relations have never been warm in recent decades, but they became especially tense after a June 2020 skirmish in the Galwan Valley of the Himalayan mountains that forms the border between the two Asian giants. That incident was remarkable in two respects: first, there was a rather heavy loss of life on both sides, and second, because neither side resorted to the use of firearms.
That latter point reflects an admirable level of restraint, but New Delhi opted to take strenuous measures to curb India’s diplomatic and economic contacts with China after the conflict. Indeed, New Delhi went much further than Washington in placing draconian restrictions against Chinese companies in the Indian market. As if to rub salt in the wound, it was Chinese-made missiles and fighters that scored victories for the Pakistan Air Force against Indian fighters during the early summer 2025 fighting over Kashmir. Thus, New Delhi’s decision to pursue a more conciliatory line on China comes as somewhat of a surprise.
The proverbial “elephant in the room” in this high-stakes global diplomacy is Russia.
Despite major Western pressure since the start of the Russia-Ukraine War in early 2022, New Delhi has steadfastly refused to downgrade relations with Moscow. To the contrary, India has benefited from cheap Russian energy to fuel its growing economy. According to one recent analysis, India possesses “the world’s fastest-growing large economy, [but] has only modest oil reserves and needs to import 85 percent of its supply.”
Recent moves by U.S. President Trump to place tariffs against importers of Russian oil have had some impact, as Indian oil refiners appear to have slowed purchases from Russia dramatically in recent weeks. Yet, in a signal of New Delhi’s defiance, Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar journeyed to Moscow prior to the Summit in Tianjin and agreed to boost Russia-India trade.
The idea, ever popular in Washington, that Indian military and diplomatic might could balance China always represented wishful thinking. While it is true that India has positive relations, including in the defense domain, with many Southeast Asian states and with Japan, the possibility of India intervening in a U.S.-China military contingency, for example over Taiwan, was never realistic. As Carnegie expert Ashley Tellis explains, “Washington’s current expectations of India are misplaced … New Delhi will never involve itself in any U.S. confrontation with Beijing that does not directly threaten its own security.”
Indian defense expenditures may be rising again, but at less than 2 percent of GDP, it hardly seems that New Delhi feels an acute urgency. And while U.S. arms manufacturers have made a handsome profit from extravagant Indian purchases over the last decade, the Indian armed forces continue to be hamstrung by an over-reliance on imported weapons. China maintains a comfortable margin of military superiority over India in all respects for the foreseeable future.
With that in mind, Indian leaders have likely concluded that militarized competition with China is unnecessary. Fortunately, “good fences make good neighbors,” as the saying goes, and China and India have a stellar fence in the impenetrable barrier of the Himalayas. That very solid border fence tends to dampen any serious security concerns. In fact, India can benefit handsomely from renewed cooperation with China, whether the issue is water usage, Kashmir sensitivities, infrastructure development or renewable energy. Beijing should reciprocate New Delhi’s more friendly demeanor by taking India’s permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council under serious consideration — a long overdue step for the world’s most populous country.
While some realists in Washington were always tempted to try to play New Delhi off Beijing, that impulse was chiefly inspired by the false perception of a Manichean struggle between democracy and autocracy. Instead, Washington should come to terms with the reality that other great powers have their own distinct interests, and that these interests must be respected if peace and stability are to be achieved.
Lyle Goldstein is director of Asia engagement at Defense Priorities.
