Today marks the expiration of the General Assembly’s one-year deadline for Israel to comply with its legal obligations in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), those outlined in the International Court of Justice’s July 2024 advisory opinion on the “Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem” (“Legal Consequences” opinion). As that deadline has approached, experts, commentators and even Member States themselves have increasingly offered proposals for what more the General Assembly could do to spur action on the increasingly dire situation in the Gaza Strip – from providing armed protection to humanitarian aid workers or naval relief convoys, to recommending or even directly mandating a peacekeeping or stabilization operation.
On July 29, 2025, the global body that appraises hunger levels officially declared famine in Gaza. After the Israeli Knesset passed legislation in October 2024 that effectively halted the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the main body providing basic services and humanitarian aid to the territory for decades, the UN Secretary-General appealed to Member States and the General Assembly. Since the renewed Israeli blockade on aid in March 2025, the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation has been one of the few outlets bringing food, medicine and other aid into the territory. But its background, setup and means of operating are controversial, and aid distribution points have repeatedly come under attack. UN experts estimate that 2000 Palestinians have been killed at distribution sites for humanitarian aid, the vast majority (70%) in areas served and protected by the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation. As a result, attention has focused not only on getting a much higher volume of relief into Gaza, but also on finding ways to ensure protection for those humanitarian convoys and distribution sites.
The Security Council has considered the situation in Gaza regularly over the last two years, and in June 2024 passed resolution 2735 endorsing a ceasefire proposal and setting out several phases for its implementation. However, since then, even the most stripped down of resolutions have not proved veto-proof. In June 2025, the US vetoed an extremely limited draft resolution that would have simply reinforced resolution 2735, and demanded an immediate ceasefire and the lifting of all restrictions on humanitarian aid. All total since October 2023, there have been no less than eight vetoes cast on resolutions related to the situation in Gaza: seven vetoed by the US (S/2025/353, June 2025; S/2024/835, November 2024; S/2024/173, February 2024; Amendment to S/PV.9520, December 2023; S/2023/970, December 2023; S/2023/792, October 2023; S/2023/773, 18 October 2023); and one vetoed by the Russian Federation and China (S/2024/239, March 2024). The only resolutions that have passed did so by virtue of an abstention by either the US, the Russian Federation or both (these were: S/RES/2712, November 2023; S/RES/2720, December 2023; S/RES/2728, March 2024; S/RES/2735, June 2024).
Given the deadlock on this issue in the Security Council, policymakers and international experts have increasingly looked to other decision-making bodies for a response. In June the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Michael Fakhri, proposed that the General Assembly might authorize armed peacekeepers to accompany and protect humanitarian aid convoys, including (but not limited to) the situation in Gaza. On Sept. 5, a group of 27 UN high-level UN experts called on the General Assembly to convene an emergency meeting and facilitate humanitarian aid by recommending a peace operation, demanding the opening of all crossings, and to “request the authorization of UN-led international humanitarian convoys” to supervise humanitarian aid flows. Then last week, the General Assembly endorsed the concluding recommendations from a July 2025 high-level conference on Palestine and a two-state solution. The endorsed final outcome document of that conference included proposals to deploy a temporary UN “stabilization mission” to Gaza to monitor implementation of a prior ceasefire agreement (negotiated in January 2025) and any future peace agreement. The proposal was for a Security Council-authorized stabilization mission, however, given the standoff in the Council, the General Assembly may be the more likely body to take such proposals forward.
With operations in Gaza now approaching their second year, and no end in sight for the humanitarian crisis, could the UN General Assembly provide the muscle to support humanitarian or peacekeeping intervention? The proposals for it to do so raise a number of questions about the legal remit of the General Assembly, as well as of any practical or procedural limitations. Can the General Assembly authorize (armed) peacekeepers and aid convoys? Under what UN Charter provisions or other legal authority? What other measures might the General Assembly take to create more pressure for humanitarian relief or Member State action on this?
In the spirit of full-disclosure, I co-authored the 2024 Digital Handbook on the General Assembly’s peace and security practice, resources from which are cited throughout this article in parentheticals and hyperlinked text.
Can the General Assembly Authorize Peace Operations, including Armed Peacekeepers?
The General Assembly has mandated peace operations throughout its history, from the first armed UN peacekeeping force in 1956, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), in response to the Suez Crisis, to the first UN peace operation to administer a territory, the UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in 1962 in West New Guinea (now Indonesia). While not all have included armed peacekeepers (as UNEF and UNTEA did), past General Assembly-mandated peace operations have undertaken the range functions that might be required to take forward the various proposals for humanitarian relief or ceasefire monitoring operations in Gaza. Past General Assembly-mandated peace operations have monitored ceasefires and overseen withdrawal of forces (UNEF), taken up policing, rule of law, and stabilization tasks (UNTEA, UNMIH), facilitated mediation and regional good offices (UNSMA, UNSCOB), monitored human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) violations (MICAH, UNSMA, MINUGUA), and facilitated and coordinated humanitarian aid and support to refugees and those displaced (UNSMA). Although not extensive, General Assembly-mandated peace operations have also incorporated maritime operations and functions (notably UNEF), which might be necessary to carry out some of the proposals regarding Gaza for protecting (naval) humanitarian aid convoys, unblocking access, or directly carrying provisions by sea.
Peace operations can also have something of a mixed model, with the General Assembly authorizing the overall mission, but that mission later (when political conditions were more favorable) incorporating armed peacekeepers mandated by the Security Council. This happened with General Assembly-authorized operations in Guatemala and in Haiti. The General Assembly has also mandated missions jointly with regional organizations, for example one with the Organizations of American States in Haiti in 1993. This is an important but under-explored facet, given growing suggestions that perhaps given Security Council deadlock and budget cuts, the future of peacekeeping will be one in which missions are primarily led by regional organizations, rather than by the UN (but with Security Council and General Assembly political and financial support). The most recent example of a jointly authorized peace operation was the General Assembly’s authorization of a joint Special Envoy position for Syria in 2011 and 2012, jointly mandated with the League of Arab States. Notably, it was linked to a League of Arab States monitoring mission, which General Assembly resolutions also lent support to (A/RES/66/176; A/RES/66/253) after several Security Council vetoes.
This sort of mixed model and interoperability with regional organizations could be particularly relevant for some of the proposals for maritime relief or protection operations in relation to Gaza. Given that the UN does not have a standing navy, where UN peace operations have included maritime components, or where these have been authorized by the Security Council alongside other peace operations, they have often been provided by regional organizations or coalitions of multi-national Member States operating under color of this broader authority (for example, with EU and US-led multinational maritime missions around Yemen’s maritime borders). Thus it might be more likely that we would see a General Assembly-authorized peace operation that included naval functions if it was done in conjunction with a regional organization or some other already identified multinational coalition.
Some of the measures proposed for General Assembly intervention would not require a full peace operation, but simply an operational body capable of facilitating aid, taking preparatory steps toward a ceasefire or the monitoring of it, or taking on other conflict management tasks. The General Assembly also has the capacity to authorize other operational bodies short of a full peace operation, including those involved in coordinating or supporting humanitarian aid delivery. The longest running example of this is the agency at the center of the humanitarian and political storm in Gaza, UNRWA, which was established by General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) in December 1949. The size of UNRWA and length of its operations illustrates the power of the General Assembly to authorize and maintain quite substantial operational bodies.
These sorts of operational bodies can also be useful in bridging gaps when the Security Council is deadlocked. In the past, when Security Council missions lapsed, or when there was not yet sufficient support to authorize a new one, operational bodies mandated by the General Assembly have filled the gaps by taking up immediate monitoring or good offices tasks or engaging in the preparatory work that would lay the groundwork for future monitoring missions or operations. One example of this was a UN office in Afghanistan that picked up the tasks of a Security Council-mandated peace operations that lapsed in 1990, and was designed to lay the groundwork for future operations. It also included military advisors, but not armed peacekeepers.
There is a similar General Assembly origin story behind the other main UN office involved in Israel-Palestine issues outside of UNRWA, the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO), which started as a General Assembly-appointed coordination position to boost good offices after the Oslo Accords. In the current context, some have suggested expanding UNSCO’s mandate to take on additional humanitarian, operational, or ceasefire support tasks. These proposals for expanding its mandate might also face blockages in the Security Council. Here again, the history of General Assembly engagement with peace operations is instructive: it has not only created peace operations, but also expanded the tasks and mandate of those created by the Security Council, as in Lebanon in 1958 and the Congo in 1960.
What is the Legal Basis for the General Assembly to Authorize a Peace Operation, and What are the Limitations? Is the Uniting for Peace Resolution Necessary?
The legal authority for the General Assembly to mandate these peacekeeping and operational bodies stems from its overall remit under the UN Charter to pass recommendations related to the “maintenance of international peace and security” and the peaceful resolution of disputes (Articles 10, 11, and 14 of the UN Charter), as well as its Article 22 power to create “subsidiary organs” or bodies. The peace operations bodies thus have the technical status of “subsidiary organs” to the General Assembly.
The General Assembly’s legal authority to do this was affirmed in the International Court of Justice’s 1961 advisory opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) (which had been requested by the General Assembly in resolution 1731(XVI)). The opinion hinged on whether the General Assembly had the legal authority to mandate UNEF and to extend another peace operation in the Congo, or if these sorts of powers only resided with the Security Council; if the General Assembly had overstepped its powers under the Charter then the costs associated would not be valid “expenses of the Organisation.”
The ICJ’s opinion on this question offered what still stands as the most decisive articulation of the balance of powers between the Security Council and the General Assembly, with specific application to the question of authorizing peace operations. It offered that responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security conferred on the Security Council by Article 24 of the UN Charter was “‘primary,’ not exclusive,” and that “the Charter makes it abundantly clear that the General Assembly is also to be concerned with international peace and security” (Certain Expenses case, p. 163). It emphasized that while only the Security Council has mandatory, enforcement authority, this does not mean that General Assembly powers are “merely hortatory” but that its recommendations and decisions can “have dispositive force and effect” and could constitute taking or enabling “action” (Certain Expenses case, p. 163). As examples of General Assembly decisions that could result in “action,” the Court pointed both to the General Assembly’s budgetary authorities and to its Article 22 power to create subsidiary organs (Certain Expenses case, pp. 163, 165).
However, the Court did introduce one important legal limitation. Because the General Assembly does not have the mandatory, coercive power of the Security Council, peace operations or other subsidiary bodies mandated by the General Assembly can only deploy with the consent of the country involved. This has been interpreted as applying not only to the particular structure of peace operations but also to other bodies or individuals that might deploy on Member States’ territories to carry out their General Assembly mandate. For example, the General Assembly has also provided the authority for mediators or envoys undertaking good offices and diplomatic initiatives, or fact-finding bodies or investigators. Where they were not able to obtain consent (for example, to enter Hungary and Syria), these individuals or fact-finding bodies have had to perform their roles remotely. The same would undoubtedly apply to armed peacekeepers or protection services not embedded in a particular peace operation or “subsidiary body” structure, if they did not first obtain consent. The particular legal challenges of consent in the case of Gazan territory are explored further below.
How Does the General Assembly Usually Authorize a Peace Operation and is the Uniting for Peace Resolution Necessary?
When UN experts recommended a list of measures for the General Assembly in early September, at the top of the list was for it to: “Call on Member states to act under ‘uniting for peace’ in line with General Assembly resolution 377(V) and recommend a peace operation.” Other commentators have gone even further, framing the Uniting for Peace resolution as an under-utilized exception or loophole by which the General Assembly could step in to “mandate a UN protection force” where the Security Council will not. Neither view is exactly on point: the Uniting for Peace resolution is not necessary for the General Assembly to take up most of the proposals for it to take action on Gaza, but nor is it sufficient to cure all the legal issues that would prevent the most forceful of them.
The Uniting for Peace resolution (adopted in resolution 377(V)) is a special procedure created in 1950 in response to Security Council deadlock over the Korean War. It created a procedure by which the General Assembly can consider a matter immediately through an emergency special session where there has been a veto (or arguably threat of veto) in the Security Council in relation to a threat to peace or act of aggression. It is not automatic: it does not come into play whenever there is a veto. Either 9 members of the Security Council or the majority of the General Assembly have to vote to activate the Uniting for Peace resolution, and they have only done so 11 times. Where an emergency special session is called in relation to the Uniting for Peace resolution, it does not necessarily mean that the General Assembly will then pass a resolution, or even if they do, that they will meaningfully take up the provisions that triggered a veto.
Most importantly, the Uniting for Peace resolution does not create or unlock any special powers for the General Assembly, other than those already granted it under the UN Charter. It does not grant the General Assembly powers to do what the Security Council might have done had there been no veto (i.e. to issue a mandatory resolution). On the other hand, this also means that the General Assembly does not need to invoke the “Uniting for Peace” resolution ((A/RES/377A(V)) for it to authorize a peace operation.
As a matter of practice, General Assembly decisions adopted during Uniting for Peace-linked emergency special sessions have been the basis for mandating or extending the mandate of peace operations, including the two missions at issue in the Certain Expenses case (UNEF and ONUC) as well as the extension of a border monitoring force in Lebanon in 1958. But there have been as many instances of the General Assembly providing the mandate or other support to peace operations or related operational bodies outside of these emergency special sessions.
While the Uniting for Peace resolution doesn’t lend any additional powers, it does give political expediency and momentum, which can be helpful in getting over the collective action problem and inertia that can be the main block to getting new initiatives and resolutions through the General Assembly. As a result, considering some of these proposals in a reconvened 10th emergency special session (first convened in connection with the Uniting for Peace resolution in 1997) would be the path of least resistance. As noted, to initiate an emergency special session requires that there first be a veto on a situation representing a threat to peace, and then a vote of 9 members of the Security Council or a majority of the General Assembly that the conditions of the Uniting for Peace resolution have been met. However, where the General Assembly has left an existing or prior emergency special session open, any Member State can request to the President of the General Assembly that it be reconvened at any time. This has happened repeatedly with the 10th emergency special session since it was first initiated in 1997. It was reconvened three times in the 79th session alone (the 2024-2025 period), directly in relation to the situation in Gaza – twice directly following vetoes in the Security Council but also in response to another matter for which there was not an immediate, precursor veto, responding to the ICJ’s July 2024 “Legal Consequences” opinion. The emergency special session remains ongoing and can be reconvened at any time, upon the request of Member States.
A last procedural point concerns the authorizing language: where the General Assembly has mandated peace operations or operational bodies in the past, how has it framed this in its resolutions? The UN experts’ proposal was that the General Assembly “recommend a peace operation.” Where the General Assembly has mandated a peace operation in the past, it has not “recommended” a peace operation but has simply “decided to establish” a mission, decided to “authorize the deployment” of the mission, or “requested” the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to set up the mission, or for the Secretary-General to “carry out the tasks entrusted” to him/her (where the mission scope is set out in another agreement or legal document). The General Assembly could of course recommend that the Security Council set up a peace operation (as was proposed by Member States recently), but among its many recommendations to the Security Council over the years (especially following vetoes), the General Assembly has not typically recommended that the Council establish a peace operation. In any case, given the number of vetoes on the Gaza situation, such a recommendation would likely not be taken up.
Would General Assembly-Authorized peacekeepers have the Necessary Level of Consent, Legally and Practically?
Because the General Assembly does not have mandatory or coercive powers, any peacekeepers, civilian missions, or operational bodies authorized by the General Assembly can only deploy to the territory with the consent of the State in question. As a matter of principle and standing practice, Security Council-supported peace operations also rely on the consent of the host State, but the Security Council’s Chapter VII authority at least allows for the scope for mandatory or coercive authority.
It is important to re-emphasize that a resolution being passed in conjunction with the Uniting for Peace resolution (through an emergency special session) does nothing to alter this fundamental consent requirement. The precedent-setting UNEF operation was authorized in connection with the Uniting for Peace resolution via the first emergency special session. And yet there were elaborate negotiations with the government of Egypt before the force was authorized, and again throughout its planning and deployment. Further, the ICJ noted the consent of Egypt in their analysis of the situation’s legality, and Egypt’s consent was a pivotal part of their conclusion that this was within the bounds of the General Assembly’s powers, as it meant that this action did not then constitute mandatory enforcement powers (Certain Expenses case, p. 170-171).
This means that even if the General Assembly authorized a “stabilization force,” monitoring mission, or a peacekeeping force to accompany relief convoys, it would need consent for those forces to enter the territory of Gaza. It seems unlikely given the restrictions on UNRWA and on other emergency aid over the last two years, that Israel would provide this consent. However, there is some legal ambiguity over whose consent would be required, and there are those who would argue that Israel is not in a position to withhold or offer its consent, or alternatively, to prevent delivery of humanitarian aid or the presence of UN agencies. The ICJ’s July 2024 “Legal Consequences” opinion offers some grounding for these arguments, but does not entirely settle the question. A matter currently under consideration by the ICJ as to Israel’s legal obligations with regard to provision of humanitarian and development assistance in Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) may flesh out this issue, depending on how the ICJ chooses to interpret the question. The opinion was requested by the General Assembly in December 2024, by resolution 79/232.
One legal theory for why Israel’s consent is not necessary would be that although Israel has “unlawfully” (in the words of the ICJ) occupied Gaza, this does not give it sovereignty over the territory, and thus the consent cannot come from Israel. In its 2024 “Legal Consequences” case, the ICJ offered detailed historical context on the status of the OPT, stretching back to the General Assembly Partition Plan proposed in resolution 181 (II) in 1948 (which proposed separate Israeli and Palestinian States), up to the 2024 resolution ES-10/23 determining that the State of Palestine is qualified for membership (paras. 51-71). The opinion also emphasized the prohibition on acquisition of territory by force and the fundamental rights of self-determination of the Palestinian people at multiple points. The Court concluded “that Israel is not entitled to sovereignty over or to exercise sovereign powers in any part of the Occupied Palestinian Territory on account of its occupation” (para. 254). An argument could therefore be made that given that Israel is not the sovereign power, it is not for Israel to withhold or grant consent for peace operations with respect to the OPT, including Gaza, but that this authority resides with Palestinian authorities.
A second argument would engage not with this question of sovereignty but with Israel’s obligations as an occupying power. Under the Geneva Conventions and international law, the occupying power has the obligation to administer the territory for the benefit of the population, to ensure that basic needs of the population are met, and to ensure to the fullest extent possible that food and medical resources are available and adequate. The General Assembly’s request for an advisory opinion in resolution 79/232 appeared to reference this obligation, asking the Court to consider: “What are the obligations of Israel, as an occupying Power and as a member of the United Nations… to ensure and facilitate the unhindered provision of urgently needed supplies essential to the survival of the Palestinian civilian population as well as of basic services and humanitarian and development assistance, for the benefit of the Palestinian civilian population” (para. 10). This question is less pertinent to the issue of consent for a UN peace operation or operational body, but instead tests Israel’s scope to deny or obstruct the delivery of basic services and external delivery of humanitarian aid where the needs of the population in territories it occupies is not met. If the Court decided that Israel could not bar external assistance in such situations, then the General Assembly might choose to enable humanitarian responses further by determining that the basic food, medical and other humanitarian needs were not met (the General Assembly’s scope to exercise such a “quasi-judicial” function is discussed further below).
A third argument advanced by some is that restricting UNRWA’s operations violates the 1946 General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. While a slightly different legal issue, given that UNRWA is also a General Assembly-mandated “subsidiary organ” (an issue that few contest), the conclusions on this argument have direct bearing on what is required for authorizing (or not interfering with) General Assembly-authorized peace operations. Among its provisions the Convention on Privileges and Immunities protects UN property and assets as “inviolable,” free from search and seizure, as well as interference by administrative, judicial, or legislative action. A statement on behalf of the Secretary-General at ICJ hearings in April 2025 noted that violations of the privileges and immunities of UN personnel had occurred, and also noted the restrictions implicit in the October 2024 law passed by the Israeli Knesset as well as others (see also this letter by the Secretary-General on restrictions on UNRWA). Nonetheless, while the 1946 Convention protects the inviolability of UN personnel and property where they are lawfully authorized and have a legal basis to be there, it may not reach to the underlying consent issue. The ICJ was certainly aware of the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities when it published its Certain Expenses opinion in 1962, and nonetheless insisted on consent for any General Assembly subsidiary body. This position would seem to suggest that there must first be a legal justification to have a General Assembly-mandated subsidiary body on the territory (and that given the General Assembly’s lack of coercive power, this hinges on consent); once the UN unit or body is legally there, certain rules and obligations are then implicated, including the inviolability protections of the Convention on Privileges and Immunities.
In its resolution 79/232 referral request to the ICJ, the General Assembly noted the Convention on Privileges and Immunities in the preamble and in some of the operative paragraphs (with respect to safety of UN personnel), but it did not reference the Convention in the direct question put before the ICJ. While no doubt a deliberate choice on the part of the Member States drafting the resolution, the ICJ could still decide to take up the issue given other references in the requesting resolution.
Regardless of whether any of these three legal theories were seen to prevail, any General Assembly-authorized forces or mission would undoubtedly face the practical challenge of lack of consent. Entry via Egypt or by sea without Israel’s consent raises an equally significant number of legal, political, and logistical challenges, full discussion of which is beyond the scope of this article.
Empty Promises or Legally Determinative Words? The Potential for other General Assembly Recommendations and Determinations to Shift the Situation
Mandating a peace operation is of course not the only recourse for the General Assembly. The other key demands by the UN experts were for the General Assembly to “[d]emand the opening of all the crossings to unrestricted humanitarian access under direct UN oversight,” demand the immediate suspension of all “failed or dangerous” mechanisms (presumably the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation), call on Member States to “deploy emergency navies carrying humanitarian aid,” request the “authorisation of UN-led international humanitarian convoys with full UN authority to coordinate and supervise all crossings into Gaza,” and demand “immediate, permanent ceasefire and the release of arbitrarily detained Palestinians and Israelis alike.”
Many of these reflect the regular content of General Assembly recommendations, and would be seen as fully within the scope of the General Assembly’s powers to recommend. Indeed, the last of their six recommendations, regarding a ceasefire and release of those arbitrarily detained, have already been taken up in two resolutions passed in the last session, in resolutions ES-10-26 and ES-10/27. However, as noted above, the General Assembly does not have mandatory or coercive power, even when acting in conjunction with the Uniting for Peace resolution. The General Assembly can certainly “demand” that border crossings be opened, or that UN aid convoys be authorized and allowed permission to enter, but this does not mean that they will be.
However, there is one other way that General Assembly resolutions – even if declarative or proscriptive in nature – might potentially alter the status or legal interpretation of the situation, in ways that might lend additional enforcement pressure. Scholars have identified a certain “quasi-judicial” role of the General Assembly, wherein the General Assembly’s determination of the facts surrounding a given situations can then influence subsequent judicial or legal proceedings (such as those before the ICJ or the International Criminal Court) or the way that other Member States interpret the legal obligations and respond accordingly. One example was the General Assembly’s 1967 declaration that South Africa’s claim to govern South West Africa (now Namibia) was terminated (A/RES/2145(XXI)), which effectively made it so. Henceforth, both the General Assembly and the Security Council referred to South Africa’s governance as an “illegal” ( see, e.g., A/RES/2372(XXII), S/RES/264). In a subsequent ICJ advisory opinion on “the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia,”, the Court found that the Assembly had the power to make such a determination.
Other examples raised by scholars include ICJ reliance on the General Assembly’s determination of the existence of “mass killings” or other atrocities in its finding that atrocity crimes had been committed (see, e.g., Barber, p. 33). In a similar vein, General Assembly determinations that the basic needs of the population were not met, and that the obligations of the occupying power had not been fulfilled, could buttress subsequent judicial findings about the obligation to admit external international assistance. Scholar Rebecca Barber has offered another theory for how this “quasi-judicial” or status-determining role could be used to overcome legal obstacles to providing humanitarian aid without host State consent. She argues that where there is overwhelming humanitarian need and a lack of host State consent, the General Assembly could determine a “state of necessity” with no other alternative but to provide humanitarian assistance given the exigence of the situation. On this rationale, the countermeasure of necessity would preclude the wrongfulness of the un-authorized humanitarian assistance.
Whether any of these recommendations or steps would be enough to shift the conduct of the parties, and quickly enough to address the urgent humanitarian needs in Gaza, is ultimately a political rather than a legal question. While the forgoing discussion suggests that there are many steps the General Assembly could take, most would also depend on concerted efforts and political will by other Member States, bodies and organizations. Nonetheless, here too is where the last 80 years of General Assembly action offers insights. It does not always move quickly, or first – it tends to give ample deference to the Security Council to first exercise its powers. But where the General Assembly takes action with the full force of its Member States behind it, it has been able to address what were at the time viewed as cataclysmic or unresolvable problems – from that first peace operation response to the Suez Crisis, to playing a leading role in galvanizing international responses to apartheid in South Africa. It has often pushed the Security Council into doing more. Equally importantly, it has created the space and mandate for the Secretary-General and UN bodies, regional organizations, ad hoc groupings of Member States, and even the private sector and civil society to innovate new mechanisms and to jointly take forward action. With the September 18 deadline now upon us, Member States in the 80th session of the General Assembly have ample options for responding to the situation in Gaza, drawing from 80 years of past precedent and practice. Nonetheless, given the scope of challenges at the moment, both in Gaza and in many other conflict and crisis situations globally, that ability to innovate new mechanisms and means of collective action may be the most important function that the General Assembly has to offer.
The post From Peacekeepers to Naval Convoys: Weighing the Options (and Legal Limits) on More Concerted General Assembly Action on Gaza appeared first on Just Security.
