The idea of a grand bargain with Beijing that trades Taiwan’s autonomy for “stability” is seductive. It promises to defuse the Indo-Pacific’s most volatile flash point before a crisis erupts. But it’s a dangerous illusion.
In her Sept. 15 New York Times essay, “Here’s How Trump Can Prevent a War Over Taiwan,” Jennifer Kavanagh argued that Washington should accept China as the regional hegemon and cut a sweeping security-economic deal, even if that forces Taiwan toward unification. The claim is that peace and prosperity would follow.
That premise misreads both China’s trajectory and Taiwan’s choice.
When U.S. leaders in the late 20th century affirmed that any cross-Strait settlement must be peaceful and voluntary, they did so with an implicit hope that China would liberalize and converge with the norms that anchor the U.S.-led order.
Nearly 50 years later, the opposite has happened. Under Xi Jinping’s banner of “national rejuvenation,” the Chinese Communist Party has tightened one-party control, narrowed space for civil society and pressed expansive territorial claims.
Taiwan’s story is the mirror image. Twenty-three million people built a world-class economy and a resilient democracy by pairing technological excellence with open debate and free exchange.
Subordinating that success to the dictates of an authoritarian system holds no appeal, especially after the unraveling of Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” — the very template once marketed to Taiwan. If Beijing wouldn’t keep that promise for Hong Kong, why would it honor it for Taiwan?
Another claim holds that because coercive unification is relentless, accommodation is the only “responsible” course. History suggests the opposite: Accommodating coercion invites more of it. Trading away a smaller democracy’s rights doesn’t remove a grievance; it validates the tactic.
If Washington were to sacrifice Taiwan, allies would read it as a retreat from core commitments. Japan and South Korea would hedge; others would cut separate deals. The region would grow more brittle, not more peaceful.
Nor would a bargain reliably safeguard American prosperity. Taiwan sits at the center of global semiconductor production. Moving it into Beijing’s orbit would concentrate, not diversify, risk, placing the world’s most advanced chips and manufacturing know-how under the political leverage of an authoritarian state.
The right answer is to accelerate friend-shoring and guardrails for critical technologies, not entrust the digital backbone to unenforceable promises.
Some argue the U.S. is ill-prepared for war with a formidable People’s Liberation Army and thus must reach a deal now. That confuses deterrence with defeatism.
The point is not to fight — it is to prevent war by making the costs of aggression unmistakably high and the benefits uncertain. That means assisting Taiwan in developing an asymmetric defense that is both affordable and credible, and that possesses the capacity to deter, endure and prevail.
It also means tightening coordination with allies, replenishing U.S. munitions stockpiles, rebuilding defense manufacturing, expanding access agreements and, together with Europe and key Asian partners, clarifying the contours of a sanctions regime that would follow any attempted seizure of Taiwan. None of this is escalatory; all of it is stabilizing.
De-risking the two largest economies should proceed in parallel: Diversify supply chains, protect critical technologies, maintain targeted export controls and keep channels open for crisis communications and practical cooperation where interests overlap.
Dialogue on military de-confliction, climate and public health is prudent. Using Taiwan’s fate as a bargaining chip is not.
Two points follow. First, the people most affected by any “deal” are Taiwanese. They repeatedly elect leaders who defend their democracy and prefer the status quo, not absorption. Washington should not presume to decide their future over their heads.
Second, a durable peace needs both a balance of power and a balance of expectations. Beijing must understand that coercion will fail. Washington must deter, reassure and communicate without compromising its principles.
A responsible policy rests on three lines:
- Fortify deterrence (asymmetric deliveries and training for Taiwan, stronger regional posture, coordinated economic consequences with allies)
- De-risk dependencies (expand chip production with trusted partners, protect intellectual property, guardrails for dual-use technologies, diversify energy and critical minerals)
- Keep channels open (crisis hotlines and rules of the road at sea and in the air, practical military-to-military contacts and narrow, verifiable agreements where interests align).
None of this guarantees harmony. But it is far more credible than sacrificing a democracy to satisfy an autocracy’s ambitions. Peace built on coercion is not peace; it is a pause that rewards the very behavior the U.S. seeks to deter.
America’s strength has never come from trading away the rights of free people to buy time. It comes from aligning power with principle, and from the quiet confidence that a rules-based order, however imperfect, is worth defending.
The surest way to keep peace in the Taiwan Strait is not to abandon democracy, but to make aggression unthinkable and dialogue inevitable.
Holmes Liao previously served as a distinguished adjunct lecturer at Taiwan’s War College and is the founder of Taiwan Advocacy, an organization dedicated to Taiwan’s security. He can be reached at holmes.liao@hotmail.com.
