With the announcement of a U.S.-brokered ceasefire between Iran and Israel (one both governments pledged to uphold conditionally, contingent on the other’s restraint), speculation has begun to shift from whether the conflict would escalate into full-scale regional war to whether this pause might create space for diplomacy, reconstruction, or even domestic reform in Iran. But such hopes risk misreading the deeper currents at play. Historical precedent and current political realities suggest that rather than ushering in liberalization, the conflict, even in its de-escalation, may cement a new phase of authoritarian entrenchment. A ceasefire may stop the bombs, but it will not reverse the repression that has long defined the Islamic Republic’s internal trajectory.
History Shows That Post-Conflict Regimes Often Become More Autocratic, Not Less
This pattern is not new. The post-conflict trajectories of Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Iran itself, among others, demonstrate that regimes emerging from external confrontation often become more autocratic, not less.
In Iraq, following the First Gulf War, Saddam Hussein responded not by loosening his grip, but by doubling down on repression. He ordered the mass killing of Kurds and Shiites, expanded the security state, and eliminated all avenues of political dissent.
In the 1990s, as Yugoslavia fractured under the weight of internal unrest and international sanctions, political leaders exploited war to justify purges, curtail civil liberties, and carry out mass atrocities. Slobodan Milošević and others cloaked repression in the language of nationalism and survival. Dissent became treason, and pluralism gave way to ethno-authoritarian rule.
Iran followed a similar trajectory in 1988. As the Iran-Iraq War came to an end, the regime orchestrated one of the largest mass executions of political prisoners in modern history. Thousands were tried in secret and executed in the span of weeks. Many had already been tried and had completed their sentences, or were nearing release. Their bodies were buried in unmarked graves, and their families were never informed. The so-called “death commissions” justified the killings as wartime necessity, but their goal was to annihilate ideological opposition.
The institutions that carried out those crimes—the judiciary, intelligence ministry, and security services—remain intact today. Many officials involved in the 1988 executions, including the late President Ebrahim Raisi, later rose to senior positions. Their successors, drawn from the same ideological and institutional networks, now have both the motive and the pretext to use this war to suppress the next generation of dissent.
Even before the recent hostilities, the Islamic Republic had launched a sweeping crackdown. The “Women, Life, Freedom” protests of 2022 and 2023 were met with lethal force. Hundreds were killed, thousands arrested, and many—some of them teenagers—executed following sham trials. A U.N. Fact-Finding Mission found that much of the violence amounted to crimes against humanity and that the government has continued to silence victims and their families seeking truth and accountability. The judiciary, closely aligned with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), routinely targets lawyers, journalists, students, environmentalists, and labor organizers. Women’s rights defenders have been systematically persecuted. In regions such as Kurdistan and Sistan-Baluchistan, the state has operated with near-total impunity.
In Iran, War Is Further Entrenching Authoritarianism
The recent war, and now its resolution, have served only to deepen these trends. In recent weeks, internet access has been sharply curtailed. Political activists and dissidents have been re-arrested, including an Iranian rapper who was sentenced to death for supporting anti-government protests and had been released from prison after two years. State media has reframed dissent as sedition, criticism as foreign collaboration, and reformist politics as a threat to national survival. Espionage cases appear to be rising and a spokesman for the judiciary has already announced that it is “redefining the crime of espionage” presumably to charge individuals easier. Just yesterday, reports emerged that more than 700 people have been arrested across the country over the past 12 days on charges of collaborating with Israel.
As recently observed by Karim Sadjadpour, a leading Iran analyst, there is currently no unified opposition with the institutional capacity or legitimacy to guide Iran through political transition, a reality that reflects both the brutal efficiency of the regime’s repression and the fragmentation of resistance. Years of exile, infiltration, and co-optation have left much of the organized opposition politically marginalized or socially distrusted. While diaspora advocacy remains vital, it has yet to produce a broad-based, representative leadership that can credibly articulate a democratic alternative. Yet this absence of formal opposition should not be mistaken for societal acquiescence. Iran’s civil society is among the most vibrant in the world, composed of a well-educated population and a deeply rooted tradition of intellectual, artistic, and political engagement. It is the only country in the region (and one of a handful in the world) to have produced two female Nobel Peace Prize laureates, Shirin Ebadi and Narges Mohammadi, both of whom have faced persecution for their defiance of authoritarianism and their advocacy for human rights. Their courage reflects a broader truth: while leadership may be fractured, the values of dignity, justice, and democratic aspiration remain deeply embedded in Iranian society. That reservoir of resilience is itself a form of resistance and a reason for hope.
But this leadership vacuum is consequential. Authoritarian regimes survive by monopolizing imagination. When no viable alternative exists, repression becomes normalized. By positioning itself as the only bulwark against foreign aggression, the Islamic Republic has secured the space to intensify its domestic crackdown with minimal resistance. Even in times of ceasefire, such regimes often expand their coercive reach under the banner of post-conflict “stability.”
International humanitarian and human rights law offer tools to constrain such abuses. But their impact depends on visibility, diplomatic leverage, and sustained political will, qualities too often absent in the international response to the Islamic Republic. Sanctions and isolation, without a broader strategy to protect civil society, risk deepening the regime’s siege mentality and inadvertently strengthening its grip.
The regional consequences of a more repressive and militarized Iranian state would be profound and far-reaching. Hardline factions within the regime would be emboldened, further consolidating power and marginalizing any remaining voices of moderation. Iran’s network of regional proxies, in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon, could re-escalate their activities, drawing the region deeper into cycles of instability and asymmetric conflict. But perhaps the most tragic consequence would be domestic: the extinguishing of the last embers of civic resistance inside Iran. Diverse, resilient, and courageous, this resistance has endured four decades of brutality. It now risks being crushed beneath the weight of repression masquerading as peace.
Stemming the Tide and Supporting Iran’s Civil Society
Still, this moment presents an opportunity, however narrow, to act. Several concrete steps, grounded in lessons from other conflict zones, can help safeguard what remains of Iran’s civil society:
First, democratic governments and international organizations should prioritize sustained support to Iranian civil society actors. This includes technical and financial assistance to independent media, women’s organizations, and human rights groups operating from exile or through secure digital platforms. The survival of civic resistance depends on their ability to document abuses, preserve collective memory, and coordinate action. Similar support to Belarusian exiled media and civil society following the 2020 crackdown helped preserve civic networks and international visibility, even after the Lukashenko regime decimated domestic dissent.
Second, states must invest in countering internet shutdowns and digital repression. This means funding circumvention tools, providing secure communications technologies, and maintaining open access inside Iran. In Hong Kong and Russia, democratic governments and organizations have supported the development and deployment of digital tools and training to help activists facing extreme surveillance. Multilateral coordination, such as the “Freedom Online Coalition” made up of 42 governments, can amplify these efforts while reducing the risk of targeted retaliation.
Third, any long-term rapprochement or settlement must include binding commitments to uphold basic human rights. International mediators, including the United Nations, should press for concrete provisions such as the release of political prisoners, the restoration of independent professional associations, and access for humanitarian observers. These guarantees should be monitored by an independent international mechanism, modeled in part on nuclear inspection regimes, with the mandate to report publicly and credibly on violations.
Fourth, accountability for atrocity crimes must remain a long-term priority. Even in the absence of International Criminal Court jurisdiction, national courts, particularly in Europe, can invoke universal jurisdiction to prosecute Iranian officials for torture, extrajudicial killings, and other international crimes. The 2022 conviction of former Syrian intelligence officer Anwar Raslan in Germany for crimes against humanity demonstrated how diaspora testimony and civil society documentation can yield landmark accountability. Similar efforts in Sweden and Switzerland, where Iranian officials were investigated for the 1988 mass executions, also offer models. These processes are slow, but they are critical to preventing impunity from becoming institutionalized.
Fifth, exiled political actors and diaspora leaders must refrain from monopolizing transitional discourse or politicizing civil society efforts. Foreign governments should engage with a broad and representative range of Iranian voices and avoid empowering polarizing figures whose involvement could undermine democratic legitimacy. They must resist the temptation to anoint self-declared “leaders” whose views do not reflect the diversity or priorities of those on the ground.
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The current ceasefire may signal the end of this particular military episode. But unless the international community seizes this moment to support civil society, bolster accountability, and protect civic space, it will merely mark the beginning of a more dangerous and entrenched authoritarianism, one forged in war, and sealed in uneasy peace.
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