In early May, Vice President J.D. Vance struck a conciliatory tone at the Munich Leaders Meeting in Washington D.C. Rather than criticizing Europe for what he described as illiberal censorship, as he did at the Munich Security Conference in February, he said the United States and Europe were on the same team. “It’s completely ridiculous to think that you’re ever going to be able to drive a firm wedge between the United States and Europe,” he told the audience. His comments provided some relief to those still reeling from his remarks in February. Some attendees were even optimistic about the Trump administration’s continued commitment to the long-term U.S. security role in Europe. “He charmed, he cleaned up from the February speech…he made everything okay,” one participant noted.
But European capitals shouldn’t get too comfortable. Though the Trump administration has not made any formal announcements, a recent Pentagon memo hints at big changes coming to the U.S. Army, with major implications for the transatlantic military relationship. Rather than continuing to hedge and hope, Europe needs to pay more attention to the administration’s actions versus its rhetoric, and plan for a future with sharply reduced U.S. military support.
U.S. Army Transformation
In an April 30 memo to senior Pentagon leadership, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth launched the Army Transformation Initiative. He framed it as a chance for generational change that would optimize the U.S. Army for tomorrow’s wars. His directive tasked the Army with fielding new advanced technologies on aggressive timelines, cutting legacy programs, and reforming its acquisition and contracting process to speed innovation.
For Europe, however, the significant parts of Hegseth’s guidance are those that received the least attention in the press. First, the guidance includes a mandate to make the Army leaner, consolidate command headquarters, and restructure operational units. Hegseth’s directive does not clarify exactly what these efforts will entail, but they will almost certainly result in a reduction in the size of the Army. The branch’s leadership, for example, has already indicated that it will eliminate at least 1,000 command staff positions at the headquarters level, and Hegseth’s memo calls for cutting active-duty and reserve force structure, including aviation and armor formations.
This move should not come as a total surprise to observers on either side of the Atlantic. Soon after arriving at the Pentagon, Hegseth instructed Pentagon planners to find ways to reallocate defense dollars toward those capabilities that would be in highest demand in an Indo-Pacific security crisis, including uncrewed systems, ships and submarines, next generation fighter jets, and precision munitions. Many of these weapon systems are operated by the Navy and the Air Force, not the Army. The April 30 memo seems to confirm the results of a budget exercise run by the American Enterprise Institute in which a diverse group of experts concluded that the only way to faithfully carry out Hegseth’s guidance and free-up necessary space in the Pentagon’s budget was to cut Army force structure. In other words, the memo makes it increasingly likely that the Army will be a “bill payer,” with cuts to its programs and forces providing the resources required to support other investments Hegseth and his advisers think are more important.
Even more notable is Hegseth’s directive that the Army “realign” its posture to better match Pentagon priorities, including defending the homeland and preventing war in Asia, and that the service cut armor and manned aircraft units from the active-duty and reserve forces. For Europe, which currently hosts two armored brigade combat teams and two combat aviation brigades, these changes should trigger alarm bells.
Hegseth does not explicitly order a drawdown of the almost 40,000 U.S. Army forces permanently or rotationally stationed in Europe, but reading between the lines, such a reduction would be required to meet his instructions. If the Army is to get leaner, increase its presence in Asia, and meet the needs of its ongoing deployment at the U.S. southern border, the service will have no choice but to bring forces home from Europe. The numbers just don’t add up otherwise.
For example, as of June 2025, the Trump administration has about 10,000 active-duty forces, mostly from the Army, stationed at the southern border, along with about 100 Stryker vehicles. Though there are no public plans to increase the size of the deployment further, at some point these forces will need to be replaced. Bringing home one or more of the brigade combat teams currently deployed in Europe would free up personnel to support what military leaders indicate will be a years-long operation at the border with Mexico. Other posture changes in Europe might also be required to balance the Army’s global commitments, for example the redeployment of air defense units to resource operations in Asia. How large a reduction in ground forces Europe should ultimately expect is unclear, but it is likely to be over 10,000.
The planned cuts to armor and aviation units should be even more worrisome to Europe. Heavy brigades and combat aviation are among Europe’s most significant military gaps, areas where it is very dependent on the United States. Armor and aviation units have traditionally made up an important part of the U.S. Army’s presence in Europe during peacetime. Under current NATO plans, they would play an even more important role in the event of a war with Russia that involves U.S. forces. Cutting the number of these units available will reduce the amount of combat power the U.S. Army can muster and deploy for potential future land wars, in Europe or elsewhere. Confirming this assessment, retired Army Major General Pat Donohoe wrote of Hegseth’s plan “This isn’t transformation. It’s disarmament.”
Army leaders have countered that heavy brigades with large, armored vehicles and manned helicopters or other aircraft simply aren’t survivable on the modern battlefield given the proliferation of drones and cheap munitions. There is some truth to that. But decades of predictions that older, heavier systems would be supplanted by new, advanced technologies have been wrong in the past and are likely wrong now too. The war in Ukraine offers plenty of examples. Though drones have contributed to battlefield innovation, artillery systems made decades ago have inflicted much of the war’s destruction. Similarly, for all the advances in long-range precision missiles, battlefield control in Ukraine still depends on each side’s ability to leverage mass and surge ground forces. A decrease in U.S. resources devoted to ground warfare capabilities matches shifting American interests, which are increasingly oriented toward Asia, but it will create additional unmet requirements for European militaries to backfill and force a sharper shift of defense burdens than they likely have planned as they prepare for future land wars.
The final warning contained in Hegseth’s Army reform initiative is the 2027 due date he attaches to most of the prescribed changes, upgrades, and cuts. Likely intended to match the 2027 date by which U.S. military leaders believe China aims to have the capabilities to seize Taiwan, the timeline has major repercussions for Europe.
Hope for the Best, Plan for the Worst
European leaders increasingly recognize that they need to spend more on defense, but they seem to be hoping for a gradual phased transition that could take between 5 to 10 years. This is an optimistic but realistic timeline for how quickly they can build up their own capabilities. Some European countries have already increased their defense spending. Poland is spending 4 percent of GDP on defense, and the Baltic States are pushing toward 5 percent. Most other European States seem likely to accept the Trump administration’s new defense spending target of 5 percent of GDP at the upcoming NATO summit, though it remains to be seen if these commitments turn into actual defense dollars before the end of this decade. If Hegseth gets his way, however, and the changes he has put in motion are complete by 2027, Europe will have to move much more quickly to ramp up spending, build up its capabilities, and assume greater responsibility for its defense before U.S. ground forces complete their downsizing and retrenchment.
For months, Europe has been engaged in a bargaining game, hoping that if it increases defense spending enough, buys enough American weapons, and cooperates with Washington sufficiently on trade issues, it can convince Trump and his advisers to remain involved in Europe’s security with minimal changes to U.S. military presence.
Hegseth’s plans to reorient and restructure the Army suggest that this is a foolhardy strategy. The Trump administration is already moving ahead rapidly to reshape the U.S. ground presence in Europe and reduce what the United States might contribute to a potential future war with Russia. Europe must accept that continued dependence on the United States is not viable and act with urgency to plan for and build a fully self-sufficient European defense.
Europe’s defense transformation will take longer than two years to be complete, of course, and some number of U.S. forces will remain in Europe after 2027. But, if it moves forward decisively, Europe can use the next two years to make substantial progress toward safeguarding the continent’s security, no matter what the Trump administration ultimately decides to do. To get there, European leaders will need to identify the capabilities they need to defend their countries without U.S. assistance and set investment targets accordingly—without attention to percent of GDP spending benchmarks. European capitals will need to overcome the coordination problems that have plagued them in the past to act collectively and at the national level. Investments that yield real increases in European combat power in the near-term should take priority, including improving the readiness of existing armor and infantry units, building missile and ammunition stockpiles, amassing large quantities of cheap drones, and dramatically expanding air defense capabilities.
Regardless of how Europe responds, however, the Pentagon would be right to begin bringing U.S. Army forces currently based there back home soon and shifting the Army’s focus to other missions and regions. Facing constrained military budgets, the Trump administration will need to set firm priorities and make hard choices about what it will and will not do. Russia’s poor performance in Ukraine should give Washington confidence that Europe can defend itself without U.S. support and that U.S. interests are best served by reinvesting its ground forces elsewhere—the homeland, the Western hemisphere, and the Pacific. At the same time, Russia’s struggles should encourage Brussels and remind Europe that an independent defense is within reach.
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