The June NATO summit in the Hague achieved great success by reaching a consensus among its members to increase the target of national defense spending to 5 percent of GDP. In addition, the cost of military aid to Ukraine is allowed to be included as part of the defense budget. Details of modernization plans were discussed earlier and are secret.
But one area that was not discussed is the reform and standardization of command and control systems of NATO countries. All this new spending and effort will come to naught if the command and control system is confused and ineffective at best or captured by the enemy at worst. NATO must give priority to reform of the command structures in its members that will make them effective and compatible with the overall NATO command.
Former communist countries, in particular, have Soviet legacies that can have significant impact on their military performance at the time of crisis or war. These legacies were revealed by Ryszard Kuklinski, a Polish military officer and liaison with the Soviet High Command, who became a U.S. spy in the 1970s.
He provided 35,000 Warsaw Pact documents, which gave details of Soviet plans to invade Western Europe, Soviet military equipment and the Soviet command and control structure. He was concerned that the Soviet Army’s planned march across Poland to invade Western Europe would result in the U.S. nuclear retaliation against Soviet forces in Poland in an effort to stop the invasion.
The information that he provided led to far reaching changes in the U.S. geopolitical posture. For one, it led to a change in NATO defense strategy. Instead of planning massive nuclear retaliation against Soviet satellites, former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1997 stated, “[Kuklinski’s] information permitted us to make counter-plans to disrupt command and control facilities rather than only relying on a massive counterattack on forward positions, which would have hit Poland.”
Second, Kuklinski leaked Soviet plans to invade Poland in response to the founding of Solidarity in December 1980. President Carter issued both public and private warnings to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev that implied knowledge of Soviet plans, thereby deterring the planned invasion.
Third, Kuklinski described the Warsaw Pact system of military command and control, which was dual in nature for peacetime and wartime. The Soviet General Staff could take control of its satellites’ armed forces at a time of war or crisis without knowledge or permission of satellite governments or even their communist parties. It was formalized in a document, “Statute of the United Armed Forces and the organs for directing them in time of war,” adopted in the late 1970s. This most clearly demonstrated the lack of sovereignty of Eastern European countries allied with the Soviet Union.
After 1989, the East European countries established the civilian control of the military and moved to reform Soviet force and command structures. Power struggles between entrenched communist elites and outside reformers resulted in uneven progress in different countries and sometimes a regression.
In Poland’s case, in 2014, pro-Russian President Bronisław Komorowski brought back the old dual system of general and operational command for the time of war and peace. In 2011, he signed an agreement with the National Council of the Russian Federation, creating the danger that the Russians can use old channels to render the Polish Army ineffective in case of national emergency and war. This structure lacks clear lines of authority and creates two centers of competing commands. Furthermore, it requires time to transition from peacetime to wartime at a time when it is most vulnerable to outside interference.
As a matter of fact, it is well known that Russia’s strategy for invasion consists of a decisive, initial attack on the civilian and military command structures in the first hours of war. The Russian military has special units whose particular task is to destroy enemy command centers at every level. Thus, if Russia destroys NATO’s ability to command its own forces and sow confusion, the war may be over before Western troops get out on the battlefield.
Exiting Polish President Andrzej Duda, elected in 2015, who is also the commander in chief, made reform of the dual command system his signature project. Last year, he introduced legislation to abolish the old dual structures and establish a combined operational command, overseeing restored commands of types of armed forces, such as, land army, air force, navy, special forces and territorial defense. This would establish a unified principle of peacetime and wartime readiness, which will not require precious time to transition from peace to war.
This new system would be similar to those that are being adopted by other NATO countries and by Ukraine. It would be virtually the opposite of the system that exists now.
However, this legislation has not been acted upon, just like his previous attempts at reform. In ten years, he did not get very far. The command system remains split for peacetime and wartime. The opposition of old Communist officers and politicians is strong. The essence of the old system remains.
NATO is in the process of transformation with increased spending, defense industrial production and recruitment in virtually all members. But this is not enough. The secure and functional command system is the key to military effectiveness. All NATO members, but particularly those from the former Warsaw Pact, should make this task a priority. But NATO must be a supervisory agent, so such important tasks do not become hostages of domestic politics.
Lucja Swiatkowski Cannon, Ph.D., is a senior research fellow at the Institute of World Politics in Washington and a strategist, expert and author on Eastern Europe, Russia and U.S.-East European relations.
