Although the seven B-2 bombers launched from Missouri’s Whiteman Air Force Base that hit Iranian nuclear facilities received the most media attention, they were accompanied by an additional 120 aircraft. These included F-35 and F-22 stealth fighters, as well as refueling tankers and various intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft. Submarines also launched Tomahawk cruise missiles at Iranian targets as part of what was termed “Operation Midnight Hammer.”
All the while, the Navy had five Aegis ships operating in the region, with SM-3 interceptors that were critical elements in Israel’s defense against incoming Iranian ballistic missiles. The Navy had two aircraft carriers operating in the region, with a third deploying to Europe that could also be redirected to the Middle East. Carrier-based F-35Cs provided air superiority and also acted as decoys in the strike on Iran.
The massive American military operation would appear to undermine the case — which a number of senior officials in the Trump administration have long put forward — that the U.S. should pull its forces from the region in order to redirect them toward the Western Pacific to confront the increasingly potent and sophisticated Chinese threat. Yet the strike on Iranian facilities, which may yet have to be repeated, would appear to demonstrate that Washington remains enmeshed in the region for the foreseeable future.
The case for the U.S. military withdrawing from the Middle East is not particularly new. As far back as the early 1990s, Secretary of State James Baker sought to have the U.S. disentangle itself from the ever-volatile Middle East. He failed, however, as have policymakers ever since.
Nevertheless, despite their role in the attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, it is arguable that at least one and perhaps both aircraft carriers, as well as several of their escorts, currently operating in the region could be redeployed to the Western Pacific.
Even in the absence of carriers and their F-35s, the U.S. has a large remaining fighter force spread throughout the Arabian Gulf. This force — which includes F-35A, F-22, F-15 and other fighter jets — operates from Qatar’s sprawling Al Udeid Air Base, Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, the UAE’s Al Dhafra Air Base, as well as Kuwait. Various intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft are already stationed in the Gulf as well.
Other fighter aircraft could be rotated into these bases as a given contingency might require. Similarly, tankers can be deployed to bases in the region; over 30 were repositioned in anticipation of the strike on Iran. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems could also be deployed to the Middle East to augment those already stationed there.
The fiscal year 2026 budget proposal, together with the budget reconciliation package, provides for 19 new naval ships, including two attack submarines and two more Aegis ships. Yet it will take years before these ships enter the fleet, and in the meantime the Navy, at less than 280 ships, will be hard put to provide a presence in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific. Something has to give.
The administration should therefore consider whether now is indeed the time to reposition part of the carrier force away from the Middle East. This is not to argue that all Atlantic-based aircraft carriers and most of their escorts should be permanently redeployed to the Western Pacific. There remain numerous requirements for carrier task forces as part of America’s ongoing commitment to NATO. Indeed, so long as there is a Russian threat to the alliance — likely the case for years to come — America’s aircraft carrier force will remain a critical element of NATO’s deterrent.
But the Middle East is another matter. There are numerous bases hosting American aircraft throughout the Arabian Gulf that could take more aircraft if necessary, giving Washington a powerful land-based deterrent. The flexibility of the submarine force adds to that deterrent. And the ability of the bomber force to transit from either American bases or Diego Garcia further underscores American power in the region.
If the naval fleet were large as it had been decades ago, it would have been beneficial to supplement America’s Middle Eastern forces with a carrier presence. But the fleet is half the size it was in the 1970s, and aircraft carriers in the Middle East, even as part of a major military operation like Operation Midnight Hammer, are a luxury that America can no longer afford.
Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.