The recent deployment of U.S. naval assets to the Caribbean Sea near Venezuela has reignited debate over the use of military force in Latin America.
Critics argue that such a move is reckless, unnecessary and reminiscent of Cold War-era intervention — gunboat diplomacy, even. But after more than a decade of failed diplomatic efforts, it may be time to confront a difficult truth: Military action could be the only remaining tool to restore democracy and stability to Venezuela.
This crisis did not begin with the Biden or Trump administrations. It dates back to Hugo Chávez’s death in 2013, when Nicolás Maduro — chosen for his loyalty, not his leadership — took power. Since then, Venezuela has devolved from a struggling democracy into a full-blown transnational criminal enterprise, a reality foreseen by Moisés Naím in 2013.
Despite bipartisan U.S. efforts to support opposition leaders like Juan Guaidó and Edmundo González, Maduro has clung to power through repression, electoral manipulation, deep ties to criminal networks and, most critically, support from Cuba, Russia and China. And although some elements of Venezuelan society might prefer to achieve a political transition without the use of force, the 67 percent of Venezuelans who voted for the opposition in the July 2024 elections — the internationally recognized vote total, despite the Maduro regime’s successful electoral theft — suggest strong support for the departure of Maduro and crew.
The Trump administration’s recent designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization of the Cartel de los Soles — the Venezuela-based criminal group allegedly headed by Maduro and his regime — marks a dramatic shift. It reframes the issue as Venezuela not being a legitimate sovereign state but rather a criminal-terrorist entity operating under Maduro’s leadership. This opens the door to legal justification for targeted military action under U.S. counterterrorism policy.
Military options need not resemble full-scale invasions. Precision strikes, naval blockades and special operations forces could be used to disrupt Maduro’s grip and support a legitimate transition. The goal is not occupation but “compellence” — the use of limited force to change behavior and restore democratic governance.
Yet even as we consider these options, we must confront the risks. Military action could worsen Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis, harm civilians and destabilize neighboring countries already burdened by refugee flows — although it is difficult to see how the situation could be any worse. Since 2014, more than 7.7 million Venezuelans (over one-quarter of the original population) have fled the country.
Unilateral action without international backing risks violating global norms and fueling anti-U.S. sentiment across Latin America. However, many in Latin America resent the U.S. more for its inattention than its hubris.
History reminds us that regime change does not guarantee democratic outcomes. Power vacuums can lead to chaos, prolonged conflict and the rise of new authoritarian figures. But the opposition has attempted to gain power through democratic actions and has been abused in the process. Ultimately, it would fall upon the opposition to rise to the occasion here.
Domestically, the political fallout could be also be severe. If the operation falters or results in American casualties, public support may evaporate. Critics will argue that the U.S. is once again overreaching in its foreign policy.
These are valid concerns. But they must be weighed against the cost of inaction. Venezuela under Maduro is not merely an authoritarian regime — it is a hub for narcotrafficking, corruption and regional instability. Its continued existence threatens regional U.S. national security interests and undermines democratic movements across the hemisphere.
As students of security studies will recall, military force has four basic functions: to defend, to compel, to deter and to “swagger.” Although the deployment of naval assets is clearly sending a message to Maduro and company, it also suggests the administration is using force to change the behavior of an adversary. But this must be done with caution. Sending assets without a willingness to use them risks damaging credibility and emboldening adversaries.
The administration’s goal appears to be regime change, not simply counternarcotics operations. Many Latin Americanists support regime change but eschew the use of force. Sorry, but in this case, the evidence strongly suggest that regime change will not occur without the use of force, or at least the threat thereof. And regime change in the case of ousting an aggressive transnational criminal and terrorist organization is a legitimate objective that would enhance U.S. and regional security.
But legitimacy alone does not ensure success. The use of force must be calibrated, proportional and part of a broader strategy that includes all instruments of national power, including diplomatic engagement, humanitarian support and post-conflict planning.
Military force should never be the first option. But when diplomacy fails, and when a regime devolves into a criminal-terrorist entity, the calculus changes. If the U.S. is serious about supporting democracy and security in the Western Hemisphere, it must be willing to act — not out of bravado, but out of necessity.
Craig A. Deare, Ph.D., is a professor of national security affairs at the College of International Security Affairs at the National Defense University. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.
